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According to Gerhard Lehmbruch, there is a growing inconsistency in West Germany be· 
tween the principles of a federal polity and party democracy, primarily because the former relies 
on bargaining, and the latter relies on majority rule as a mechanism of conflict regulation. 
However, comparative analyses have shown that federalism and party competition are not in-
compatible. Generally, federal structures are neither detrimental nor conducive to the recruit-
ment function of parties. Competence and experience as a parliamentary leader or as a specialist 
is the most essential precondition for advancement to national executive positions. The integrative 
capacities of political parties may even be strengthened by the federal division of power. Only 
in the area of the formulation and implementation of public policy may an inconsistency be-
tween the federal system and party democracy arise because the strain on consensus-building 
inherent in German cooperative federalism may, under specific conditions, prevent the national 
majority party from converting its programs into public policy. 
When Gerhard Lehmbruch published his book Party Competition in the 
Federal System, he pointed to a growing inconsistency between the function-
ing of the federal state and of party competition. From his point of view, 
the patterns of competitive conflict regulation in the German party system 
contradict the tradition of consensual decisionmaking typical of federal 
systems. I From another perspective, Klaus von Beyme evaluates political 
parties as centralizing forces in modern German history, as opposed to 
federalism, which is aimed at distributing political and administrative power 
between the central state and its constituent parts.2 Contrary to Lehmbruch 
and von Beyme, who are mainly concerned about the tensions between con-
sensual federalism and competitive party democracy, empirical analyses in 
comparative politics by Arend Lijphart clearly demonstrate that the mixed 
type of competitive party system and consensual federalism is more frequent 
in stable democracies than the ideal federalist-consensual or competitive-
centralist type.3 According to William H. Riker, too, a close correspondence 
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Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 211-222; Arend Lijphart, 
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between decentralized party systems and partially centralized federalist struc-
tures has increasingly developed in modern democracies.4 
FEDERALISM AS AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF 
WEST GERMAN PARTY DEMOCRACY 
The integration of party democracy and federalism was also part of the con-
stitutional philosophy of the founders of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
In accordance with the demands of the Allied occupation forces, the founders 
intended to revitalize the strong tradition of German federalism that goes 
back to the Holy Roman-German Empire.s At the same time, however, 
they wanted to institutionalize party democracy as a new legitimate element 
of constitutional practice. Consequently, Article 20, I of the Basic Law 
designates federalism as a basic element of the German constitutional system, 
protected against any kind of legal change.6 Contrary to the German 
cultural tradition of a largely nonpartisan bureaucratic state, the role of 
political parties was now mentioned explicitly. According to Article 21 of 
the Basic Law, political parties participate in the formation of public opin-
ion and in the decisionmaking process of the Federal Republic. Their 
organizational structure has to meet the requirement of intraparty democracy, 
and they have to accept the leading principles of pluralist democracy. The 
role of political parties is regulated in detail by a special federal law, the 
Parteiengesetz, which was enacted in 1967. By recognizing the role of political 
parties as an essential element of democracy and by trying to integrate party 
democracy and federalism, the Basic Law established a largely new element 
in German constitutional thinking as well as in constitutional practice. Ac-
cording to Article 28, I, the basic principles of the national political order 
apply to the constitutional framework of its constituent parts, including the 
Liinder. 
From the beginnings of the Federal Republic of Germany, political par-
ties had to operate in a context essentially characterized by a distribution 
of political and administrative responsibilities between the central state (Bumf) 
and the Liinder. In order to influence political decisions in national and Land 
politics, party organizations had to correspond, at least roughly, to the federal 
structure of the larger political system. Some kind of intra-organizational 
decentralization not only was demanded by the role of parties in their political 
environment, but also was imposed by law as an element of intraparty 
democracy and division of power (see sections 6 and 7 Parteiengesetz). 
"Democratic Political Systems: Types, Cases, Causes, and Consequences," Joumalof Theoretical 
Politics I (Spring 1989): 33-48. 
4William H. Riker, "Federalism," Handbook of Political Science, vol. 5, eds. Fred L Green-
stein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison Wesley, 1975), pp. 93-173, especially 
pp. 133-136. 
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Bayerische Landeszentrale fur Politische Bildungsarbeit, 1977), pp. 21-32. 
60ther constitutionally prescribed and protected principles are democracy, the republic, and 
the social state. 
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Due to their distinct organizational traditions, German political parties 
met this requirement rather differently. The Social Democrats (SPD) tradi-
tionally have had a highly centralized organization. The party's structure has 
deviated markedly from the territorial organization of the larger political 
system. With a few exceptions, party organizations did not exist at the Land 
level (Landesverbiinde), or if they did, they played a limited role in intra par-
ty life.7 Special party districts (Bezirke) and sub-districts (Unterbezirke), not 
organized according to Land boundaries, served as intermediary units be-
tween the strong national party organization and its local branches (Orts-
vereine). Any efforts to strengthen the role of the Land party organization 
failed until the 1960s. Since then, Land party organizations have been 
formed, Land party statutes passed, Land party leaders elected, and Land 
party headquarters established in addition to the existing organizational 
framework. 8 Today, there exist SPD Land organizations with more or less 
important recruiting and policymaking functions in every Land, but their 
role still remains limited when compared with the strong Landesverbiinde 
of the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Liberals (FDP). The latter 
two were strongly decentralized organizations from their beginnings; the same 
applies to the Green party established between 1977 and 1980. There are eleven 
statewide CDU, FDP, and Green organizations in the Liinder, including the 
Bavarian Christian Social Union (CSU), which did not join the CDU na-
tional party in 1950, with district organizations roughly corresponding to 
the administrative districts and county organizations in every county. The 
CDU/CSU runs local party organizations in almost all cities and rural com-
munities, whereas the smaller Green party and the FDP are present as political 
organizations only in larger cities. 9 Up to now, the Land party organizations 
of the CDU, the FDP, and the Greens have played an essential role in in-
traparty life. 
THE PERFORMANCE OF PARTY FUNCTIONS IN THE 
FEDERAL SYSTEM 
From different starting points, then, German political parties built up an 
organizational infrastructure appropriate to fulfill party functions in national 
and Land politics. Although these functions are somewhat controversial in 
the theory of political parties, there is a certain degree of consensus among 
researchers that at least three functions have to be fulfilled in a working par-
ty democracy: the recruitment of political leaders, the formulation and im-
1These exceptions were Bavaria, the city-state of West Berlin, and the small Liinder of 
Schleswig-Holstein and Saarland, which encompassed only one single statewide party district. 
8For a detailed description of the formation of the Land party organization in Rhineland-
Palatinate, see Heino Kaack and Ulrich Sarcinelli, "Parteien und Wahlen, .. 401ahre Rheinland-
Pfalz: Eine politische Landeskunde, ed. Peter Haungs (Mainz: Verlag H. Schmidt, 1986), pp. 
145-148. 
9A short description of patterns of party organization is to be found in Wolfgang Rudzio, 
Daspolitische System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (2nd ed.; Opladen: Leske und Budrich, 
1987), pp. 146-152. 
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plementation of public policy, and the integration of the electorate into the 
political community.lO In the following sections we will examine whether the 
federal organization of the West German political system has any impact 
on how parties perform these tasks. 
The Recruiting Function 
In every democracy, parties play an essential role in recruiting legislative 
and executive personnel. Given that the issues decided at the polls are not 
well known in any detail by the electorate, and the voters normally have on-
lya limited knowledge of the qualities of the candidates for leadership posi-
tions, party labels serve as a reference point for voters. 
Evidently, the recruitment function of political parties is not performed 
in the same way in federal as in unitary systems. In a federal system con-
sisting of largely autonomous units, the units (states, provinces, Liinder, can-
tons) may provide an opportunity for political participation and party com-
petition that is absent from unitary political systems. This thesis should be 
analyzed separately with regard to the intraparty recruiting process and to 
the electoral decision applying to the national and Land political systems. 
In addition to the election of local councils and the national parliament, 
the West German electorate has the right to choose among party candidates 
for eleven Land assemblies (Landtage). These are, in turn, responsible for 
choosing Land executives (Landesregierungen) which, therefore, are selected 
indirectly by the people of the Liinder. The number of directly elected Land 
representatives varies between 50 (Saariand) and 204 (Bavaria), and it totals 
approximately 1,400. 11 A comparably broad base of independent recruit-
ment agencies does not exist in unitary systems. As a consequence of party 
competition in the Liinder, the citizens of a federal political system exercise 
participative rights in the recruitment of political leaders not available to the 
electorate in unitary systems. 
In addition, citizens in the Federal Republic may influence indirectly na-
tional political decisionmaking by casting their ballots in Land elections, 
because the Liinder are involved in the recruitment of some national of-
ficeholders. The president of the Federal Republic is elected by an electoral 
body consisting of all members of the German Bundestag and an equal 
number of delegates of the Liinder who are elected by the Landtage (Article 
54 GG). The Liinder play a role in selecting the members of the Federal Con-
stitutional Court (Bundesverjassungsgericht), half of whose members are 
lOFor a detailed analysis of party functions in democracy see Sigmund Neumann, "Zum 
vergleichenden Studium politischer Parteien," Beitrage zur allgemeinen Parteienlehre: Zur 
Theorie, Typologie und Vergleichung politischer Parteien, ed. Gilbert Ziebura (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), pp. 218-225; Klaus von Beyme, "Krise des 
Parteienstaates-ein internationales Phiinomen?" Parteien und BUrger: Ansichten und Analysen 
einer schwierigen Beziehung, ed. Joachim Raschke (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), pp. 
87-100. 
liThe exact number of representatives varies from election to election, due to some special 
provisions of electoral laws. 
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elected by the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, respectively (Article 94 GG). 
These elections, without exception, are partisan. Half of the members of the 
German Bundestag are selected in voting districts, the other half from separate 
Land party lists (Landeslisten). The Land electorate shares indirectly in the 
respective selection processes by allocating power to the competing Land par-
ties. The Land party organizations can exert a strong direct influence on the 
nomination process. Whereas they usually follow the recommendation of 
their national party leaders in selecting the president of the Republic and 
the members of the Constitutional Court, the situation is completely different 
in the nomination of candidates to the national parliament. In this respect, 
the effectiveness of the Land party as a recruiting agency largely depends 
on its autonomy from the influence of the national party organization. 
Autonomy implies the right of the Land party rank and file to select Land 
political personnel according to their own preferences. 
As many authors have shown, the recruiting function of Land party 
organizations in drawing up party lists is not markedly restricted by the na-
tional party. There are many indications that national party leaders do not 
have the power to control effectively the nominating processes in subnational 
party organizations and to promote candidates who are opposed by local 
or Land party organizations. In 1983, for example, the SPD's national leaders 
failed to secure the nomination of former federal Chancellor Willy Brandt 
as the leading candidate on the Rhineland-Palatinate Landesliste. In this case, 
as in many others, restrictions on the autonomy of the Land party organiza-
tions emerge primarily from decisions previously made by the local organiza-
tion. Even the nomination of the candidates for the Landeslisten is largely 
a result of bargaining between local and regional party elites. 12 
Apart from their function as means of selecting the Land assemblies and 
governments, elections in the Liinder serve increasingly as "midterm elec-
tions" in national politics. Leaders of the national party branches participate 
in Land campaigns, and frequently claim Land elections to be a vote on the 
conduct of the national government. 13 Many voters seem to have adopted 
this approach to Land elections, too, because only a small minority of the 
electorate evaluates the performance of the Land party independently from 
the national government's performance. Voters generally perceive Land and 
national parties as homogeneous policymaking organizations; consequent-
ly, they use their ballot in Land elections as an instrument for protesting 
or supporting the national government's policies. As Rainer Dinkel has 
shown, the parties running the national government normally suffer losses 
12Peter Haungs, Parteiendemokratie in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Berlin: Colloquium 
Verlag, 1980), pp. 36-41; and Heino Kaack, Geschichte und Strukturdes deutschen Parteien-
systems (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971), pp. 595-645. 
13Rainer Oinkel, "Oer Zusammenhang zwischen Bundes- und Landtagswahlergebnissen," 
Wahlsoziologie heute: Analysen aus Anlass der Bundestagswahl1976, ed. Max Kaase (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1977), pp. 349, 355-356; for a more detailed analysis, see Georg Fabritius, 
Wechselwirkungen zwischen Landtagswahlen und Bundespolitik (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 
1978). 
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in Land elections. These are more marked at mid term than at the beginning 
or the end of the legislative session of the national parliamenLI4 
Because national and Land elections normally are held in different political 
settings, it is difficult to explain the causes of different vote shares of political 
parties in either type of election. In 1983, Land and national elections were 
held on the same day in the Rhineland-Palatinate (i.e., under identical political 
circumstances). This provides an opportunity to explore the degree of cor-
respondence between electoral results in Land and national elections. As Table 
1 shows, neither turnout nor the vote shares received by the competing par-
ties in Land and national elections differed markedly. Turnout was identically 
high for both electoral contests (90.4 percent). The two major parties, CDU 
and SPD, fared somewhat better in the Land than in the national election, 
while the obverse was true in the case of the FOP. The Green party got an 
equal vote share in both elections. When Land vote shares in the thirty-six 
counties and independent cities are regressed on the corresponding vote shares 
in the national election, an almost straight line is displayed indicating a perfect 
linear dependency of the former on the latter, with up to 99.6 percent of 
variation of Land vote shares explained by national vote shares. The pattern 
of the voters' decision in the Land and national elections is largely the same, 
with some difference remaining in the absolute percentage points of the vote 
shares in each election in the thirty-six units of analysis. ls 
In addition to an analysis of the Land-related selection of political per-
sonnel, the political systems of the separate Liinder may serve as points of 
access to national leadership positions. According to Gerhard Loewenberg 
and Heino Kaack, however, this pattern of recruitment is the exception rather 
than the rule. During the period examined by Loewenberg, members of the 
German national executive (Bundesregierung) were recruited almost exclusive-
ly from leading positions in the national parliamenLI6 Only rarely were they 
recruited from careers in the Land's executive or legislative branches. This 
description seems still to be valid with regard to most cabinet members, but 
the situation differs from time to time. 
Whether a national executive career typically starts in the Land arena can 
be analyzed most appropriately in situations where there are major exchanges 
of national government personnel. In addition to the formation of the first 
14Dinkel, "Der Zusammenhang zwischen Bundes- und Landtagswahlergebnissen"; Rainer 
Dinkel, "Landtagswahlen unter dem Einfluss der Bundespolitik: Die Erfahrungen der letzten 
Legislaturperioden," Wahlen und politische Einstellungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
Neuere Entwicklungen der Forschung, eds. Jiirgen W. Falter, Hans Rattinger, and Klaus G. 
Troitzsch (Frankfurt: Lang, 1989), pp. 253-262. 
ISFor a more detailed analysis see: Ulrich Sarcinelli, ed., Wahlen und Wahlkampf in 
Rheinland-PfaIZ: Beitriige fur die politische Bildungsarbeit aus Anlass der Landtags- und 
Bundestagswahlen am 6. Miirz 1983 (Opladen: Leske Verlag, 1984), and Peter Haungs and Eckard 
Jesse, "Die rheinland-pfiilzische Landtagswahl vom 6. Marz 1983: Erste Doppelwahl in der 
Geschichte der Bundesrepublik," Zeitschrift fur Parlamentsfragen 14 (Winter 1983): 517-531. 
16Gerhard Lowenberg, Parlamentarismus im politischen System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland (fiibingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, Hermann Leins, 1969), pp. 299-318; Kaack, 
Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems, pp. 670-673. 
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TABLE 1 
National and Land Elections in Rhineland-Palatinate, 1983 
National election 
Land election 
Turnout CDU SPD 
Statewide Election Result 
90.4 
90.4 
49.6 
51.9 
38.4 
39.6 
FDP 
7.0 
3.5 
Greens 
4.5 
4.5 
Regression of Vote Shares of Land Election on National Election 
Intercept 
Slope 
Variance explained 
3.140 
.982 
.989 
.190 
1.204 
.996 
-.090 
.639 
.487 
.417 
.918 
.817 
SOURCE: Statistisches lahrbuch fur Rheinland-PfaIZ, 1988/89 (Bad Ems: 
Statistisches Landesamt Rheinland-Pfalz, 1988), p. I %; computations done 
by the author. 
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national cabinet in 1949, major changes have taken place in 1966, 1969, and 
again in 1982. When the first cabinet of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was 
formed, six of fifteen cabinet members had belonged to a Land government, 
with two of them (Wildermuth and Seebohm) directly changing from a posi-
tion in the Land government to the Bonn Cabinet. As L6wenberg points out, 
Adenauer deliberately left out leading politicians from the Ldnder in select-
ing the members of his cabinet. 17 In the Grand Coalition Cabinet of 
Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger (1966-1969), eleven of nineteen members 
did not belong to the previous administration, and seven of them had held 
a Land government position some time before. However, only three were 
recruited directly from a Land executive (Kiesinger, Willy Brandt, and Lauritz 
Lauritzen).18 Even more limited was the recruitment function of the Land 
governments with regard to the first cabinet of Chancellor Willy Brandt 
(1969). It was comprised of eleven newly appointed members, only one of 
whom, Helmut Schmidt, served as a Land cabinet minister in the early 196Os. 
Before entering the cabinet, he was the influential leader of the SPD 
parliamentary group. When the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government head-
ed by Chancellor Helmut Kohl was formed in 1982, only three of its seven-
teen members-all FDP cabinet veterans in the SPD-FDP coalition 
government-belonged to the previous administration. Four of the newly 
appointed officials had held positions in a Land government (Chancellor Kohl 
and Ministers Geissler, BlUm, and Stoltenberg), the latter two coming directly 
17Lowenberg, Parlamentarismus im politischen Syslem der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, p. 
293. 
18Kaack, Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems, pp. 512-513. 
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from there. 
As these examples show, the recruitment function of the Land government 
for the national executive varies considerably over time. However, a direct 
move from Land to national executive positions is not firmly institutional-
ized in West Germany. The limited relevance of this recruitment pattern 
becomes even more apparent if compared with the role that leading parliamen-
tary positions play in the recruitment of future cabinet members. This may 
be demonstrated by analyzing the political background of members of the 
incumbent Bonn cabinet. Only one of its members, U rsula Lehr, did not have 
any parliamentary or executive experience before she was appointed as 
minister of family affairs. Two mem bers belonged to the Bundestag without 
having any leading function in the national parliament prior to their appoint-
ment as members of the government. Only two were immediately recruited 
from a Land government without having had any kind of parliamentary career 
(Scholz and T6pfer). Nine cabinet members occupied some parliamentary 
leadership positions before being selected for a leading executive function, 
and three previously had Land government as well as parliamentary leader-
ship experiences (Chancellor Kohl, Stoltenberg, and Bliim). In summary, the 
most important precondition to being selected as a member of the national 
government is a parliamentary career. It can be argued, then, that the political 
system of the Federal Republic of Germany increasingly has adopted the 
features of a parliamentary party state. 
The function of the Liinder as a starting point for a national executive 
career is demonstrated most clearly with regard to the offices of federal 
chancellor and leader of the opposition. Only Chancellor Konrad Adenauer 
did not hold any kind of leading executive position in a Land government 
before he entered the national government. Each of his five successors 
moved more or less directly from a top position in a Land executive to the 
office of federal chancellor or opposition leader. With only one exception 
since 1961, all opposition candidates for federal chancellor were prime 
ministers (Ministerpriisidenten) of a Land. 19 
A far more intense exchange of leadership positions exists between the na-
tional and Land party organizations. This is especially apparent in the COU. 
Five members of the party's top executive organ, the Parteipriisidium, hold 
simultaneously the position of chairman of one of the Land party organiza-
tions. Nearly all of them are, or were, leading figures in the executive or 
legislative bodies of a Land. The chairmen of five of the six remaining Land 
party organizations are represented in the larger executive organ, the 
Bundesvorstand. Occupying a top position in the political system of the 
Liinder is one of the most important preconditions to being elected as a 
member of the party elite at national conventions. The same is true to a lesser 
degree for the SPO and for the FOP. (The statute of the Green party pro-
19 All data relating to cabinet formation at the national and the Land level were drawn from 
Peter Schindler, Datenhandbuch zur Geschichte des Deutschen Bundestages 1949 bis 1982 (3rd 
rev. ed.; Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1984), pp. 372-388. 
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hibits any accumulation of leadership positions.) It is clear that the internal 
structure of German political parties, organizationally as well as with regard 
to elite-recruitment patterns, is strongly federal. 20 
To summarize, the political system of the Liinder serves in a variety of 
ways as a starting point for national political careers, depending on the type 
of national position. Politicians holding regional leadership positions fre-
quently move up to the national party elite, while tending to retain their role 
in the Land political system. This combination of leadership positions serves 
as an important means of promoting communication and cooperation be-
tween the various branches of the national party, but it contributes to an 
enormous intraparty concentration of political power as well. It is not easy 
to make a clear judgment as to whether this kind of intraparty cooperation 
has a negative or a positive impact on the autonomy of Land party organiza-
tions. On the one hand, it may have a centralizing effect and restrict cen-
trifugal tendencies in Land party politics. On the other hand, and this seems 
to be more probable, Land party elites may use their presence in the national 
party executive organs to exercise influence on the politics of the national 
party. 
A similarly close connection between national and Land leadership posi-
tions in the executive and legislative branches of the political system is pro-
hibited by law. Advancement to national executive and legislative offices only 
rarely starts in the Liinder. Nevertheless, the leaders of the national opposi-
tion party enjoy, in the short run, only one opportunity to gain experience 
in executive affairs (i.e., election or appointment to an executive office in 
one of the Liinder). In light of the fact that a major change in government 
has occurred only three times since the founding of the Federal Republic, 
this opportunity is important in light of the high evaluation by the German 
electorate of executive competence as a quality of political leaders. In a federal 
system, certainly, broader opportunities for acquiring leadership experiences 
are available than in unitary states. In appraising the positive effect of 
federalism on the recruitment function of political parties, however, it should 
also be noted that experience does not necessarily equal competence, and 
an executive career in the national government does not usually originate 
in a Land executive branch. 
The Formulation and Implementation of Public Policy 
Leadership recruitment and the formulation and implementation of 
political programs are related party functions. In order to convert party plat-
forms into binding public policy, parties need to control the executive and 
legislative branches of government. Conversely, party platforms serve as in-
20See further details in Heino Kaack, "Zur Struktur der politischen Fiihrungseliten in 
Parteien, Parlament und Regierung," Handbuch des deutschen Parteiensystems: Struktur und 
Politik in der Bundesrepublik zu Beginn der achtziger Jahre, vol. I, eds. Heino Kaack and 
Reinhold Roth (Opladen: Leske Verlag und Budrich GmbH, 1980), pp. 195-219; Kaack, 
Geschichte und Struktur des deutschen Parteiensystems, pp. 512-514. 
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struments in a political party's attempt to gain control of the government. 
Political parties participate in manifold ways in the process of shaping a 
society. They aggregate the demands of the electorate, integrate them by for-
mulating more or less comprehensive political programs, and, in turn, pre-
sent their programs to the electorate. In performing these functions, they 
contribute to organizing and regulating political competition for the control 
of governmental power. As majority and minority parties, they share in the 
legislative process. In controlling the executive, they prepare and implement 
authoritative public policies. Article 21 of the Basic Law designates these 
tasks as legal functions of political parties. 
Although there is a broad discussion in international political science about 
whether political parties adequately perform their policymaking function in 
a federal system, it is by no means clear just what the notion of "influencing 
the conduct of government" really means in practice. Not only because of 
conceptual unclarity but also because of serious gaps in comparative empirical 
research on public policymaking, it is easier to evaluate the parties in their 
recruitment functions than in their policy-shaping capacity. In contrast to 
a unitary political system of the British type, the broad diffusion of 
policymaking responsibilities in federal systems has often been described as 
a source of immobilism. In unitary systems, the national government and 
the parliamentary majority supporting the government are not markedly 
restricted in realizing their policy preferences by countervailing powers. By 
casting a ballot, the voter allocates governing power to a certain political 
party, and he or she makes a clear choice between distinct political programs. 
After having been entrusted with power, the parliamentary majority is ex-
pected to implement its program according to the voters' majority decision. 
In contrast, as a result of various constitutional and legal provisions and of 
developments in the practice of federalism, the West German national govern-
ment has to accommodate its policy options to the demands of a large number 
of actors, each holding specific policymaking responsibilities. 21 
As a great number of case studies concerning cooperative federalism in 
the Federal Republic demonstrate, there has been a far-reaching intermin-
gling of Land and federal powers. The emerging pattern of federal-Land 
cooperation clearly goes beyond the provisions for federal cooperation 
originally found in the Basic Law. 
The bulk of national law is passed not only by the Bundestag. The 
Bundesrat, which represents the Land cabinets in the federal political pro-
cess, has the right to veto any act passed by the Bundestag affecting the rela-
tionship between national and Land authorities. This applies to all areas of 
public policy that are implemented by the Liinder and that involve tax shar-
ing. With a few exceptions, such as foreign and defense policy and interna-
tional trade, almost all public policies are included in this fusion of legal 
and administrative competencies. Since 1949, legislative powers have been 
21 Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 169-186. 
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assumed increasingly by the federal parliament. As a reaction, the Bundesrat 
has claimed a comprehensive right of participation in national legislation. 
This claim is not limited to the implementation of federal law by Land 
authorities, but includes the policy content of federal legislation as well. 
In addition, the past two decades have witnessed the establishment of a 
large number of institutions in which federal and Land powers are closely 
interwoven. Among these are the planning boards for the "joint tasks" of 
the federal and Land governments, the council for public financial plan-
ning, and the more or less institutionalized conferences of the leaders of 
federal and Land departments. Many important areas of public policy are 
included in this system of cooperation, such as land-use planning, regional 
economic development, transportation, and urban renewaJ.22 
The developments may be seen as undermining to some extent the voters' 
influence on the formulation and implementation of public policy, since na-
tional as well as Land governing parties are not able to implement their (and 
the majority of voters') policy choices as easily as is supposedly possible in 
unitary systems. Instead, the national government must accommodate its pro-
grams to the needs and demands of other party branches controlling the 
Liinder. The Land governments, in turn, are subjected to federal law in many 
policy areas, or they have to adjust their policy strategies in areas involved 
in the system of cooperative federalism to the governments of other Liinder. 
Due to these restrictions, party competition does not work effectively as a 
means of choosing specific sets of public policies in national and in Land 
politics. 
As a consequence of the need for federal cooperation, the policymaking 
function of political parties and the concept of responsible party government 
may be undermined especially when the following conditions are met: 
(I) Major differences exist between the political programs of the national 
majority and the minority parties; 
(2) Most Liinder are governed by the national minority party or parties whose 
regional branches follow the policy choices of the national opposition; and 
(3) Agreement of the majority of the Liinder is required for the realization 
of federal programs. 
All of these conditions are not generally present in German politics. With 
regard to the first condition, a detailed analysis of the impact of party 
ideologies on Land policies conducted by Manfred G. Schmidt demonstrates 
that only in a few areas do the two large competing German parties, 
CDU/CSU and SPD, have diverging policy profiles. Whereas the issues of 
public education, law and order, and the scope of the public sector are mat-
22Laufer. Dos/6derative System der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. pp. 121-150; Lehmbruch. 
Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat. pp. 72-124; Rudzio. Dos politische System der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland. pp. 309-324. 
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ters of party conflict, this is not characteristic of most issues immediately 
involved in the cooperative decisionmaking structures. The existing policy 
differences sometimes attributed to the dynamics of party competition were 
found primarily in periods of economic growth when political innovations 
could be implemented without redistributing private incomes. In addition, 
the emergence of a particular policy profile of a Land government became 
most probable when Social Democrats continuously dominated that govern-
ment for a long time and when they did not need to form coalition cabinets. 
Never did a major policy shift result immediately from a change in govern-
ment from the CDU/CSU to the SPD or vice versa.23 
A strong institutional tendency toward a consensual political style exists 
primarily in legislative cooperation between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
and in the planning boards responsible for "joint tasks" when most ad-
ministration in the Liinder is controlled by the national opposition party. 
In the areas involved in these cooperative decisionmaking systems, the na-
tional administration needs to be supported by a majority of the Land ex-
ecutives in order to implement its programs. Even though party conflicts are 
sometimes found in the Bundesrat, they are rather exceptional, and the large 
bulk of federal law is enacted unanimously, even by the Bundestag. The deci-
sionmaking practice of "joint task" planning boards is even more nonpar-
tisan because they perform mainly administrative functions. Their main 
responsibility is to distribute federal and Land funds which may, of course, 
be controversial. However, conflicts spring more from regional interests than 
from diverging ideologies. 24 
Given that the remaining institutions of cooperative federalism do not have 
decisionmaking authority, and lack the power to require anyone of the par-
ticipants to carry out joint policies that contradict individual policy 
preferences, their activities do not really impinge on the policy-shaping func-
tion of political parties. Conferences of the leaders of Land and federal 
departments as well as the distribution of federal grants appear to have only 
a very limited policy-shaping capacity. The issue of educational policy in re-
cent years is a good example of the fact that federal cooperation did not pre-
vent the majority parties in the German Liinder from realizing divergent policy 
preferences.2s 
Research on cooperative federalism in Germany demonstrates that there 
are some restrictions on the implementation of goals held by the governing 
party. However, it is unclear whether this is due to federalism. The national 
23Manfred o. Schrnidt, CDU und SPD an der Regierung: Ein Vergleich ihrer Politik in den 
Liindern (Frankfurt, New York: Campus Verlag, 1980). 
24Fritz W. Scharpf et al., Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen 
Foderalismus in der Bundesrepublik (Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag, 1976), pp. 81-94, 110-121. 
On the role of the Bundesrat in the legislative process see Laufer, Dos f6derative System der 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, pp. 69-84; Rudzio, Dos politische System der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, pp. 272-281; and Hans-Georg Wehling in this issue. 
2sLehrnbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, pp. 153-157; Schrnidt, CDU und SPD 
an der Regierung, pp. 89-112. 
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administration must promote a consensus-oriented policy style because of 
factors that exist also in centralized political systems, such as the need for 
coalition formation in multiparty systems, the requirement of winning the 
support of various pressure groups, and the political power of the national 
bureaucracy. Comparative studies might provide some insight into the im-
pact of federalism on the relationship between party politics and policy out-
put. In general, there seems to be a distinctive policy pattern of leftist and 
rightist administrations. The former favor an expansion of the public sec-
tor, especially in the form of large welfare programs, and they are mainly 
concerned with securing full employment. The latter are interested in limiting 
public expenditures, their welfare programs are less ambitious, and their prime 
economic goal is fighting inflation. 
Some of the studies conducted so far include centralism/federalism as an 
explanatory variable. As Frank Castles and Robert D. McKinlay found, 
unitary states are more active in social welfare policy than are federal states, 
even after the effect of party variables is controlled.26 The interesting ques-
tion of whether governmental policy output is more strongly influenced by 
party ideologies in unitary than in federal systems has never been tested ade-
quately until now. A re-analysis of data from Manfred G. Schmidt's research 
on economic and welfare policy in Western democracies casts serious doubt 
on the assumption that federalism might prevent the governing party from 
realizing its ideological preferences. Long-term conservative dominance in 
government has a fairly similar negative effect on the political regulation of 
the economy in federal and in unitary states. Because of the small number 
of cases, however, these results should be interpreted cautiously.27 As a 
result of a change in government, a shift from a more leftist to a more con-
servative policy profile occurred in centralized political systems like Britain 
or France as well as in federal states like the United States and Germany. 
Another consequence attributed to the emergence of cooperative federalism 
is a certain lack of political innovation. Party competition is said to have 
an innovative effect on public policy. It contributes to placing new issues 
on the political agenda and to opening the political process to the demands 
of formerly neglected groups. However, political innovations are to be ex-
pected only if an innovation-oriented government can exercise control over 
policy implementation. This also is impeded by the bargaining style of 
consensual-federal politics, which, in effect, may lead to immobilism.28 
26Frank Castles and Robert D. McKinlay, "Does Politics Matter: An Analysis of the Public 
Welfare Commitment in Advanced Industrial Democracies," European Journal of Political 
Research 7 (Summer 1979): 174-179; David R. Cameron, "The Expansion of Public Economy: 
A Comparative Political Analysis," American Political Science Review 72 (Winter 1978): 
1246-1249, 1251-1255; Manfred G. Schmidt, Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik unter biirgerlichen 
und sozialdemokratischen Regierungen: Ein internationaler Vergleich (Frankfurt, New York: 
Campus Veriag, 1982), pp. 39-56. 
27See the data in Schmidt, Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik, p. 222, Fig. 27. Kendall's tau c coef-
ficient~ between conservative/liberal dominance and the political control of the economy are 
very similar in federal and centralist systems, with -.346 and -.408, respectively. 
28Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, pp. 36-42; Arend Lijphart, Democracy 
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Assessing the innovative effects of party politics under varying institutional 
conditions in a reliable way is difficult. The studies cited above demonstrate 
that federalism tends to dampen public spending, especially in the area of 
welfare. However, whether this is seen as innovative or counter-innovative 
depends largely on the analyst's ideological preferences. Whatever the mean-
ing of "innovation," innovative programs may be blocked, among other 
reasons, by bargaining strains inherent in federalism. There exist other, at 
least equally important, impediments to an innovation-oriented public policy 
conducted by a national administration-for example, the veto power of in-
fluential pressure groups and the general public, conflicts within the ad-
ministration and within the party, and limited government revenues. It is 
not by accident that all of these problems have been discussed extensively 
under the label of the "governability" of Western democracies, and that 
federalism/centralism has not been a major factor in this discussion.29 
Federalism does not seem to be of major importance for the policy-shaping 
functions of political parties in West Germany. 
The Integrative Function 
Attracting as many supporters as possible is essential for a political party 
to win control of the government, and various attempts are made at perform-
ing this integrative function. Political parties introduce their followers' policy 
aspirations into the political process and make them parts of their platforms. 
They offer participatory devices that enable the public to influence political 
decisionmaking, and they function as agents of political socialization. 
In the search for electoral support, political parties become involved in 
conflict with other parties pursuing the same goal. Integrative functions, 
therefore, cannot be performed without friction resulting from tensions be-
tween the requirements of party-related and system-related integration. The 
former implies antagonism between competing parties, the latter calls for 
a sense of community that includes the leaders as well as the rank and file 
of the competing parties. 
Federal systems are frequently established because of serious integrative 
problems in the respective societies. Where the various cleavages exist along 
regional lines, federalism may serve as an adequate mechanism of integrating 
the regions into an overall political community.30 This complementary in-
tegrative function of party democracy and federalism may be easily 
demonstrated with regard to the German party system. 
The pre-Nazi party system was strongly fragmented in a twofold manner: 
in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 50-52; Scharpf et al., 
Politikverflechtung, pp. 20-22, 225-233. 
29Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: 
Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission (New York: New 
York University Press, 1975). 
30Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 41-47, 87-99; Lijphart, Democracies, pp. 
169-186. 
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there were many political parties and each was closely tied to separate and 
narrow segments of the social cleavage structure. Contrary to many other 
modern states, a constitutional cleavage was a constitutive element of party 
conflict. Legitimacy was not granted to the political system by some major 
parties during the German Empire or during the Weimar Republic.31 
Following the foundation of the Federal Republic, patterns of party 
cleavage have been simplified by the formation of the CDU and CSU, which 
united the previously separated Catholic and Protestant sectors of society. 
Similarly, the rightist and leftist branches of Liberalism became integrated 
into the FDP. However, the traditional antagonism between German par-
ties did not disappear immediately. During the early 1950s, almost all im-
portant political issues were matters of bitter party conflict. This was true 
especially for the new economic order, the question of rearmament, and the 
integration of Germany into the Western Alliance. The SPD national minority 
party was unable to secure adoption of its proposals on any of these issues. 
Because its minority position lasted from 1949 to 1966, the complete failure 
to influence the conduct of public policy could easily have estranged its par-
tisans from the political system. 
This did not happen for several reasons. Because the Social Democrats 
controlled the administration of several Liinder during this period, they had 
an opportunity to realize some of their goals, at least in Land politics. From 
1949 to 1966, two Liinder, Hesse and Bremen, were continuously governed 
by the Social Democrats, and so were West Berlin and Hamburg for most 
of the time. Only in the Rhineland-Palatinate were they without any role 
in forming a government after 1949. The Christian Democrats continuously 
controlled the administrations of the Rhineland-Palatinate, Bavaria, 
Schleswig-Holstein, and Baden-Wiirttemberg, even after they had lost power 
at the national level in 1969.32 In spite of the fact that substantial changes 
in the national government involving the two leading parties occurred only 
three times, a share of executive power in the political system of the Liinder 
has made an important contribution to the integration of the supporters of 
the minority party into the political community. 
Federal systems enable political parties to perform their integrative func-
tion in still another way. In the Liinder, coalitions may be formed of political 
parties which are adversaries in the national political system. Indeed, since 
1949, coalition patterns in the Liinder have displayed a greater variety than 
31 Lehmbruch, Parteienwettbewerb im Bundesstaat, pp. 19-24; and Lijphart, Democracy in 
Plural Societies, pp. 15-16. 
32Riker, Federalism, pp. 137-142, offers a somewhat more sophisticated concept to measure 
the federal diffusion of power, an index of disharmony which is designed to measure the extent 
of control exerted by the national governing party over the executive of the constituent Liinder. 
It ranges between zero (when the national majority party controls the executive of all consti-
tuent Liinder) and one (complete absence of subnational executive power of the national ma-
jority party). The application of Riker's index to West Gemany is somewhat complicated by 
the existing multiparty system. In the period of 1950-1966 (control of the national government 
by the CDU/CSU), it varied between .38 and .55; for the period between 1970 and 1982 from 
.43 to a high of .64, and between .36 and .45 since then. 
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has been the case in national politics. In four Liinder, "Grand Coalitions" 
made up of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats were in office for 
several years (West Berlin, Lower Saxony, Baden-Wiirttemberg, and the 
Saarland). In other Liinder, Christian Democrats shared in a coalition with 
parties that were part of the national opposition, while Social Democrats 
co-governed with minor national governing parties, especially with the FDP. 
An interesting, but short-lived, experiment in integrating a marginal party 
was the SPD/Green coalition in Hesse in the mid-1980s. Another example 
is the SPD/Green coalition since the winter of 1989 in West Berlin. Thus, 
Land politics may serve as an experimental field for national coalition-
building. New patterns of party coalitions bringing about a change in na-
tional government were initiated first in some of the Liinder, examples of 
which are the formation of an SPD-FDP coalition in North-Rhine Westphalia 
in 1966, and a CDU-FDP administration in Lower Saxony in 1977 and in 
the Saarland in 1980. During the last twenty years, however, coalitions in 
the Liinder have conformed increasingly to the national pattern. Coalitions 
formed by the Liberals and Christian Democrats were rare exceptions be-
tween 1969 and 1982, as have been Social Democrat/Liberal coalitions since 
1982. 
CONCLUSION 
Federalism does not consistently impinge on the performance of political par-
ties in a democracy. Federal diffusion of power improves the recruitment 
function of political parties, although the political system of the Liinder could 
probably serve even better as a recruitment base for national political leaders 
than is actually the case. 
The formation and implementation of public policy are often said to have 
become more difficult than in previous decades. Federal bargaining processes 
may have contributed to this development, but they are by no means the 
sole reason for the problems national administrations confront when im-
plementing their policy choices. It remains rather unclear as to what degree 
federal cooperation really interferes with the policymaking functions of party 
government, especially since there is an increasing strain on intra party and 
intra-administrative bargaining. Due to a changing social composition and 
an increasing ideological diversification among their members and followers, 
German political parties have become far more pluralistic organizations than 
they were previously. Therefore, many of the difficulties attributed to the 
tension between party competition and federalism are rooted in the party 
system itself. 
The most important effect of federalism on the working of party democracy 
relates to the integrative function of political parties. The federal distribu-
tion of political power provides the national minority party with opportunities 
to share in governing the country. This is an essential contribution to the 
integration of its leaders and followers into the national political community. 
